Exact packet interpretation
- Problem
- Models were unreliable at byte counting and raw hex interpretation.
- Approach
- Preprocess traffic into structured protocol and flow context.
- Result
- Shift the task toward reasoning over meaningful evidence.
PROJECT_05 / Applied security research
Testing where AI helps security analysis—and where it falls short.
STACKLLMs · Azure · PCAP analysis · Modbus · PostgreSQL
The research had two tracks: enriching security alerts with asset and CVE context, and analyzing industrial PCAPs from the 2023 UNB CIC Modbus dataset. The question was whether AI could support useful security analysis rather than simply generate plausible explanations.
My contribution
I worked with a co-op student on model evaluation, packet-data preparation, alert enrichment, and the design of a validation loop for AI-generated analysis.
Raw packet bytes require exact interpretation. Models struggled with byte counting and hex-level reasoning, while narrow training examples did not generalize reliably to varied traffic. Convincing output was not sufficient evidence of correct analysis.
We evaluated open-source cybersecurity-tuned models, prepared structured JSON for Azure fine-tuning, and compared prompting approaches. Traffic was reformatted into higher-level protocol and NetFlow-style context to give models a clearer basis for reasoning.
Fine-tuned models performed efficiently when the incoming PCAP closely matched the traffic structure seen in the training examples, but the approach degraded when the packet patterns varied from the baseline.
One-shot, multi-shot, and chain-of-thought prompting handled variation better than fine-tuning alone, but the outputs were still not accurate enough to be trusted as a reliable threat-detection workflow.
A more agentic pipeline showed better potential by having models generate expected frames or baselines, compare them with observed traffic, and use a feedback loop to reject and regenerate invalid analyses.
Dummy asset records in PostgreSQL were combined with CVE information so an LLM could explain potential vulnerabilities in the context of an asset. This explored an assistive workflow rather than an autonomous detection decision.
The models were not reliable enough to serve as a standalone threat-detection engine. Structured inputs and validation loops were more promising than direct raw-byte reasoning. The project was put on hold after the co-op term ended.